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COMMENT

THE FEDERALIST'S PLAIN
MEANING: REPLY TO TUSHNET
ANITA

L.

ALLEN*

is a polemical defense of the proposed 1787 Constitu
tion of the United States. 1 The series of eighty-five essays composed by
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay was first published
in New York newspapers under the collective pseudonym Publius.
Through his original reading of The Federalist, Professor Tushnet charts
unexplored connections among theories of judicial selection and tenure,
judicial accountability, and constitutional interpretation.
The Federalist

Tushnet maintains that there is a sinkhole in The Federalist's land
scape. Publius would require life-tenure federal judges to be kept
accountable to the enlightened preferences of a free people by doing the
impossible: interpreting legal texts in accordance with their plain or
common sense meanings. Yet, Tushnet urges, experience and theory
demonstrate that legal texts do not have "plain meaning. " The reality of
honest disputes over meaning devastates "the interpretative project of
The Federalist, and with it The Federalist's defense of judicial review."2
My response to Professor Tushnet comes in the form of reactions to
the arguments set out in his paper. The three Parts below present my
understanding and assessment of those arguments. I am in sympathy
both with Tushnet's descriptive analysis of The Federalist and with his
conviction that there is no easy sanctuary in plain meaning adjudication.
Much of what I will say is thus corroborative.3
*

Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Ph.D. 1979, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1984, Harvard University.
I. THE FEDERALIST at viii-ix (1961) (introduction by Clinton Rossiter).
2. Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View From The Federalist
Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1669, 1699 (1988).
3. I do not plan to separately discuss Tushnet's contention that The Federalist papers imply
an important connection between judicial tenure and a theory of interpretation. As Tush net explains
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The thrust of my critical commentary is, first, to emphasize that
although The Federalist relies on common sense and common law
approaches to interpretation, no single theory of constitutional interpre
tation receives a sustained development or defense. Despite internal and
external evidence of a plain meaning theory, recalcitrant passages in the
essays appear to deny that written law has plain meaning. These
passages demand reconciliation. Second, the lack of definition in the
plain meaning theories which Tushnet ascribed both to The Federalist
and recent Supreme Court opinions blunts the impact of his central
claims. Third, while Tushnet contends plain meaning interpretation can
not measure up to "modernist social and linguistic philosophy,"4 the
yardstick he employs is of uncertain philosophic dimensions. As a conse
quence, his seemingly broad assertion that any and all versions of plain
meaning theory are futile is not entirely convincing. 5
I.
The pivotal thesis of Professor Tushnet's paper is that The Federalist
assumes an untenable plain meaning theory of constitutional interpreta
tion. Is he correct? Does The Federalist assume a plain meaning theory?
in his article, Tushnet,

supra

note

2,

at

1680-89, The Federalist's

democratic vision requires judicial

accountability; but, contrary to Madison's and Hamilton's arguments, it does not require judges to
be appointed as opposed to elected or to have life tenure. Tushnet's insight is that Madison's argu
ments only support the appointment of judges for terms which are relatively long when compared to
the terms of members of the political branches.

These long terms insulate judges from powerful

minority factions and powerful majorities that, from time to time, lose sight of the public good. The
structural safeguard of a separate, independent federal judiciary is a good practical assurance but it is
not foolproof. Like other citizens, judges are capable of losing sight of the public good and becoming
a powerful minority faction.

A

normative theory of interpretation is needed to account for how

courts are obligated to apply the fundamental law of the people.

A few

brief remarks about the necessity

vel non

of life-tenure. Judges who know they are likely

to return to private life after a term of years on the bench will have special incentives to decide cases
so as to enhance their reputations among those in the private sector on whose good graces they will
most depend after retirement from the bench. This could result in individual judges subtly aligning
themselves with special interests. To minimize this possibility, life-tenure and attractive fixed sala
ries, as urged in

The Federalist,

would seem prudent.

That the institution of life-tenure relies heavily on the pers-:Jna! commitments of judges cannot
be overstressed. Life-tenure works only if judges accede to the expectation that they remain in office
for extended periods. If appointed or elected judges were frequently to resign their posts in pursuit
.
of greater opportunity, life-tenure and the values it protects would be threatened. The notions of
"judicial character" and "judicial temperament" surely ought to include a personal commitment to
substantial longevity and isolation on the bench.

4.

Tushnet,

5.

Tushnet raises the possibility that some sophisticated contemporary version of plain mean

supra

note

2,

at

1693.

ing theory might escape his criticisms.

See id.

at

1688.

But

I

read him as unpersuaded and raising

objections which, if they panned out, would be objections in principle.
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Tushnet's affirmative answer relies upon both internal (textual and logi
cal) and external (historical) evidence. Before turning to his evidence, I
would like to air preliminary concerns about the meaning of "plain
meaning."
The meaning of "plain meaning" and the centreal tenents of the
plain meaning interpretative theory which Tushnet found in The Federal
ist were never spelled out. Yet, as a term applied to describe a normative
theory of interpretation, "plain meaning" lacks plain meaning. A defini
tion of this term quickly becomes crucial for deciding whether The Fed
eralist assumes a plain meaning theory and no other. Absent a working
understanding of the expression "plain meaning theory," the search for
internal evidence of a plain meaning theory in The Federalist cannot have
a precise direction.
Precision is needed to decide the functional equivalence (or other
pertinent relationship) of the various interpretative norms Tushnet
attributes to The Federalist and the Supreme Court: namely, that judges
ought to render the law in accordance with ( 1) common sense, (2) natu
ral and obvious senses, (3) manifest tenor, (4) explicit and unambiguous
language, (5) precise terms, and (6) plain meaning. Tushnet's criticisms
are only as powerful as his intended target is well-defined. 6
Tushnet argued that The Federalist relied upon a futile plain mean
ing theory. Not only was it futile in theory, as established by modern
linguistics and social theory, but it was also futile in practice, as evi
denced by recent Supreme Court opinions ostensibly undertaking plain
meaning adjudication.7 A degree of precision about plain meaning and
related interpretative theories is important for Tushnet's cross-historical
argument. He argued that contemporary failures at adjudication
through appeal to, for example, "explicit and unambiguous provisions"
also evidence the futility of The Federalist's plain meaning theory. 8 Yet,
Tushnet himself made the point that the changed meaning of "common
6. Consider what would be involved in specifying the terms of a plain meaning theory. Most
words have meanings, but some, like articles and expletives, seem sometimes only to have function.
The meaning of a word can be distinguished from its senses, its senses from its referents, and its
denotations from its connotations. And to what is plain meaning to be contrasted-ambiguous
meaning? vagueness? obscurity? meaninglessness? pointlessness? On what does plain meaning
depend-internal logic? mental states? purposes? uses? All these questions about word meaning
arise before one even gets to analogous inquiries about propositional meaning.
7. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 ( 1982).
8. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (summary of Tushnet's argument that con
temporary and 18th century plain meaning theories are similarly flawed).
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sense" would complicate contemporary adaptation of plain meaning the
ory.9 No straightforward identification of The Federalist's reliance on
"common sense" construction with conte�porary reliance on what we
call "common sense" is really possible. Tushnet has put his finger on one
important instance of a general problem that can only be solved by an
exposition, more specific than the one he has given, of the tenets of the
plain meaning theory attributed to The Federalist.
all likelihood, the plain meaning theory attacked in Tushnet's
Symposium paper is a brand of the "extremely implausible" textualism
he has sought to discredit elsewhere on the ground, inter alia, that it
purports to give us courts without politics. 1 0 Textualism is any anti
interpretivist theory of legal interpretation which contends:
[A]t least some provisions of the Constitution need not be interpreted
In

but only applied because they are entirely clear, because the meaning
of the text is available to courts without interpretation, or because the
text itself excludes enough possible interpretations to reduce the dan
gers thought to lurk in unrestrained constitutional interpretation." 1 1

The textualist contention, when expanded beyond the Constitution to
include legislative texts, appears to form the core of the plain meaning
theory which Tushnet alleges The Federalist proffers as a solution to the
problem of judicial unaccountability.
II.

Notwithstanding the problem of defining "plain meaning," I now
consider whether Tushnet is correct that The Federalist assumes a plain
meaning theory. I will proceed with a rough understanding of plain
meaning theory as the view that (to paraphrase Tushnet) grasping the
meaning of legal texts does not require interpretation or that the meaning
of such texts is plain enough to exclude sufficient interpretations to
diminish the dangers of unrestrained interpretation.
Relying on logical, historical and textual evidence, Tushnet argues
that The Federalist assumes a "strong theory about interpretation, "
namely, a plain meaning theory. 1 2 As logical evidence Tushnet uses his
deduction that the plain meaning theory is a virtual entailment of The
Federalist's view of government and judicial review. The argument from
9. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1694.
10. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival ofTexwalism in Constiwtiona/ Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
683 ( 1982).
II. !d. at 683.
12. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1670-1689.
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logic also reflects a sense of history. Tushnet suggests that the internal
logic of The Federalist moves ineluctably toward the need for a norma
tive theory of interpretation. Such a theory augments the fruits of the
"incredibly productive"13 search for structural guarantees that led to the
idea of federalism, the separation of powers, and a life-tenured federal
judiciary. At stake in the search was nothing less than the enlightened
protection of natural rights and the public good. A normative theory
was needed to reconcile judicial review and the possibility of factious
judicial tyranny with judicial accountability to a democratic people.
For what reason did the authors of The Federalist assume the plain
meaning theory over other normative theories? Tushnet's answer is that
they made the assumption naturally, because doing so was an easy adap
tation of Enlightenment assumptions about the powers of human rea
son 14 and prevailing common law interpretative traditions. 1 5 He also
answers that they did so prudently, because Hamilton feared that a more
subtle theory might alienate ordinary citizens from constitutional dis
course. I suppose the idea here is that even if Hamilton believed that a
more subtle theory were true, he still would have advanced the plain
meamng theory to facilitate civic education about republican judicial
rev1ew.
Tushnet's answer 1s m line with H. Jefferson Powell's conclusion
that "The Philadelphia framers' primary expectation regarding constitu
tional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal docu
ment, would be interpreted in accord with its express language."16
Hamilton and other federalists defended the Constitution against anti
federalist skeptics by arguing that "It was . . . the people's unquestiona
bly republican intention, evinced in the plain, obvious meaning of the
text, that would control future interpretations."17
Powell's historical perspectives do not rule out, however, alterna
tives to the plain meaning theory. Eighteenth-century republican theory
is compatible with an interpretive strategy that is frankly contractarian. 18
13.

Jd. at 1688.

14. See generally M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1987) (discussing philosophy underlying The Federalist).
15. Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 894,
903 (1985) (discussing historical origins of original intent as an interpretative norm).
16.

Jd. at 903.

17.

Id. at 907.

18. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-64 ( 1986) (contractarian inter
pretative theory applied to first amendment and privacy jurisprudence).
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A contractarian theory would prescribe that the meaning of constitu
tional text is to be determined by reference to "what rights and powers
sovereign polities (and individuals] could delegate to a common agent
without destroying their own essential autonomy."19 Contractarian
interpretative theory may be more subtle than simple-minded plain
meaning theory. But, as argued below, no simple-minded plain meaning
theory can be plausibly attributed to The Federalist. It is not obvious,
then, that a contractarian interpretative theory would have struck early
federalists as significantly more subtle--or less restrictive-than a plain
meaning theory. Indeed it could be argued that knowledge of the
requirements of rational agreement and moral autonomy on which social
contract theory rests would have been deemed as accessible as knowledge
of the plain meaning of fundamental law. Both would have been con
ceived of as accessible to reason and common sense.
One finds very little direct internal textual evidence for the view that
The Federalist assumes a plain meaning interpretative theory. Tushnet
seems to have correctly identified the best evidence of this theory at work
in Hamilton's claim, in The Federalist 83, that "the natural and obvious
sense of (the Constitution's] provisions, apart from any technical rules, is
the true criterion of construction."20 Hamilton's reference to the "natu
ral and obvious sense" of constitutional provisions implies that the Con
stitution is accessible by virtue of its alleged plain meaning. Hamilton's
reference in The Federalist 78 to the "manifest tenor of the constitution,"
may carry the same implication.2 1
While passages in The Federalist 83 bring to mind a plain meaning
theory, language in other passages can be read as a rejection of a plain
meaning theory. Most notably, language in The Federalist 22 seems to
19. Powell, supra note 15, at 888.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
2 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton's refer
ence to the "manifest tenor of the Constitution" can be read as implying that, when encountered by a
person competent in the English language, the Constitution has a readily discernible (i. e. , plain)
meaning which courts should apply. But the proposed reading places a great deal of weight on the
word "manifest," while it ignores the ambiguity of the word "tenor." It is not apparent from the
context why one should construe "tenor" as synonymous with "meaning." Hamilton's exact state
ment was that "Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the constitution void." THE FEDERALIST 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. rossiter ed. I 961 ).
Under present day idiomatic American usage, "tenor" and "meaning" are seldom synonyms except
possibly where "meaning" is used to refer to connotative, as opposed to denotative, meaning. So
used, the "tenor" of a text could refer to the set of all that the text connotes.
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go against the grain of plain meaning theories. Addressing the argu
ments of his confederationist opponents against a federal judiciary, Ham
ilton wrote that, "Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and
define their true meaning and operation.'m Hamilton's words are
ambiguous; yet, they can be readily construed as the words of a "judicial
activist" or other interpretivist who rejects plain meaning and holds that
courts impart meaning to law through appeal to political, moral or eco
nomic goals rather than "dead letter" scratches in ink. It would be
admittedly absurd to imply without regard to extrinsic evidence that
Hamilton was a proponent of a strongly interpretivist theory. I merely
suggest that not everything said about the judicial role in The Federalist
points unambiguously towards a plain meaning theory of interpretation.
In The Federalist 22, continuing his defense of a federal judiciary,
Hamilton contended as follows respecting the treaties of the United
States: "Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all
other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uni
formity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last
resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL."23 This argument for a federal
judiciary is based on the need for uniformity and finality and implies that
treaties and other legal documents do not have plain meaning. For adju
dicative uniformity and finality would seem to follow from interpretative
uniformity and finality, which would itself seem to follow from the prac
tice of rendering texts in accordance with their plain meaning. Hamil
ton's concern for uniformity and finality implies that he held one of two
beliefs about the need for a federal judiciary. He must have believed
either that (1) the meaning of texts is significantly and impracticably
indeterminate and a final arbiter is needed, or (2) state judges lack the
common sense, reason, skill, and character needed to decide cases in
accordance with the plain meaning of the written law.
According to Tushnet, The Federalist's vision of democratic govern
ment and judicial review requires a normative theory of interpretation
that keeps the structurally independent judiciary accountable to the will
of the people as expressed in their constitution and statutes. A normative
theory of interpretation which obliges judges to place democratic ideals
and individual rights above their own preferences is called for by The
Federalist's conception of government and judicial review. A plain
meaning theory could fill the bill and, according to Tushnet, it did.
22.

THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

23.

!d.

. i
l
l
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It is important to keep in mind that a normative theory of interpre
tation was not a device that the authors of The Federalist emphasized.
Insofar as the plain meaning theory can be found, expressly or by impli
cation, in The Federalist, it is offered alongside a variety of other theories
and arguments aimed at assuring readers that the institution of life-ten
ure federal judges would further, rather than undermine, the public
good, individual rights, and majoritarian self-government.
In the first instance, The Federalist stressed the structural con
straints on the judiciary. The judiciary was but one branch of govern
ment in the constitutional scheme. Judges who breached standards of
"good behavior" were subject to impeachment by Congress. The Feder
alist 78 and 81 stressed the judiciary's lack of the power of the purse and
the sword. Even if the judiciary developed a will contrary to the public
interest and ceased to exercise proper judgment, it had no means to
finance or execute its will.
The Federalist recognized that structural constraints are not abso
lutely infallible. But the main point is that a good deal of faith was
placed in them. Hamilton argued that structural constraints are so effec
tive in general that practical persons who know history, political science,
and human nature have no genuine grounds for concern:

It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judici
ary encroachments on the legislative authority which has been upon
many occasions reiterated is in reality a phantom. Particular miscon
structions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may now
and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an
inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the polit
ical system. This may be inferred with certainty from the general
nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates, from
the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness,
and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And
the inference is greatly fortified by the ... important constitutional
check which is the power of instituting impeachments in one part of
the legislative body, and of determining them upon them the other ....
This is alone a complete security.. . . [J]udges ...would hazard the
united resentment of the [legislature] ... while its body was possessed
of the means of punishing their presumption by degrading them from
their stations.24

Nonetheless, as if anticipating that the existence of structural safe
guards would fail to convince every reader that federal judges would not
24.

THE FEDERALIST No. 8 1, at 484 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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exceed their just and intended bounds, The Federalist offered bits of nor
mative theory. It offered normative theories of judicial role morality and
judicial character. It offered, as discussed, normative theories of inter
pretation. Both types of normative theories imply guidelines for judicial
selection and training. The judicial role calls for individuals with com
mon sense, uncommon rational judgment, knowledge of legal traditions,
(including traditions of interpretation and construction), and knowledge
of the public good. The judicial role also requires control over passions
that cloud judgment and weaken one's ability to repress self-interest for
the sake of the public good. The Federalist's message is that such "phi
losopher judges" exist and have been relied on in the past with over
whelmingly positive results.
III.
As previously noted, Tushnet argues that "it [is] futile at best to rely
on The Federalist's theory of constitutional interpretation. "25 In effect,
he argues that it is futile in practice and in theory.
It is futile in practice because "contrary to recent commentary, even
separation of powers decisions cannot readily rest on plain meaning anal
ysis."26 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,27 the legisla
tive veto case, serves as an illustrative example. In Chadha the Court
ruled unconstitutional provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("Act") empowering either House of Congress to overturn by resolu
tion a decision of the Executive Branch. The Court affirmed a Ninth
Circuit ruling that under the separation of powers doctrine the House of
Representatives lacked constitutional authority to deport an alien whose
deportation an Immigration Judge had suspended on account of extreme
hardship pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney
General. In addition to the Act's legislative veto provision, the legisla
tive veto provisions of numerous federal statutes in which Congress had
retained the authority to undo the determinations of agencies to which it
had delegated powers fell. 28
Chadha depicted utilitarian or functional interpretations of the Con
stitution as a threat to the values of democratic self-government. Func
tional interpretation is unwarranted where "[e]xplicit and unambiguous
25.
26.
27.
28.
(analysis

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1693.
!d.
462 u.s. 919 (1982).
See generally Spann, Deconszructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1984)
of Chadha, legislative vetoes, and indeterminacy problem).
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provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective func
tions of the Congress and of the Executive."29 Tushnet shows that the
Chadha case is an object lesson in the futility of plain meaning interpreta
tive theories since even constitutional provisions defining and prescribing
legislative and executive functions prove to be less than "explicit and
unambiguous." Tushnet's analysis reveals that the Supreme Court was
simply mistaken in its claim that the case before it could be decided
solely by reference to the Constitution's "explicit and unambiguous" lan
guage. For example, the Chief Justice asserted the case would be
resolved by the "precise terms" of the Constitution.30 Yet, the Court had
to decide at least one matter not subject to resolution by the "precise
terms" of the Constitution: whether a one-house veto based on a resolu
tion entered by a single member of Congress was an exercise of legislative
power. The Court reached its decision about whether legislative power
had been exercised by assessing the purposes and effects of the action
taken by the House.
Tushnet argues that it is futile in theory to rely on plain meaning
analysis because modern social philosophy and philosophy of language
indicate that there are no plain meanings. He states that plain meaning
analysis is at odds with the "unavailability of plain meanings to resolve
normative disputes."31 He also takes the position that the phenomenon
of honest disputes over the meaning of texts would seem to prove that
written law lacks plain meaning of the requisite sort. Tushnet thus con
cludes that plain meaning analysis is opposed both by the social reality of
disputes over the meaning of legal texts and by the fundamentally non
linguistic character of those disputes.
Tushnet interprets modern philosophy of language, symbolized by
ideas associated with the enigmatic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, to
support one of three alternative propositions, each of which he believes to
be devastating to the plain meaning interpretative theory. The proposi
tions are that: (1) real contests over the common sense meanings of
words cannot occur; (2) real contests over the common sense meanings of
words can occur, but the winners are those who rely on ordinary lan
guage; or (3) real contests over the common sense meanings of words can
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945.
30. Id. Article I, section I, of the Constitution providing that ''All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives," was the key constitutional provision with ''precise terms" that the court
found "critical to the resolution." ld. This is the so-called bicameralism requirement.
3 1.

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1693.

l

\

\
i

I

I
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occur, but there can be no winners because disputes over language mean
ing have no rational resolution. It is far from obvious that these
"Wittgensteinian" propositions can indeed be adapted from their home
in puzzlement over metaphysical, epistemological, and metaethical dis
course to puzzles over ordinary legal discourse. 32
Assuming the plausibility of Tushnet's adaptation, his conclusion
that plain meaning analysis is a sinkhole looks promising. For if the first
"Wittgensteinian" proposition is true, one must explain away the appear
ance of real disputes over the meaning of ordinary legal discourse. If the
second is true, judges must be viewed as arbiters of common sense and
some political account for why they should have that role must be given.
If the third proposition is true, courts are robbed of any ability to ration
alize their resolution of disputes about what the written law requires.
There would be nothing for the courts to say once, to borrow a line from
Wittgenstein, they had shown the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. 33
32. Wittgenstein had a great deal to say about language meaning. In Tractatus-Logico
Philosophicus, he advanced the view that the meaning, if any, of a proposition that is neither empiri
cally or logically grounded is unspeakable; hence the cryptic ending of his book-What we cannot
speak about we must pass over in silence--twice alluded to in Tushnet's symposium paper. See
generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS-LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS (1921) (analysis of relationships
among propositional logic, facts, and hearing). Wittgenstein's views underwent a significant change
after Tractatus. The views both of the "early" and the "later" Wittgenstein seem to have influenced
Tushnet.
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein suggested that the key to meaning is often to be
found in language use; language as used in what he called "language games" rooted in so-called
"forms of life." See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1958) (exposition of the linguistic nature of philosophical problems).
Wittgenstein's attack on traditional philosophy, the heart of his work, was that philosophical pro
positions were not part of a language game rooted in a genuine form of life. The real task of philoso
phy is not ethical or metaphysical, but grammatical. Its proper role is "uncovering .
. plain
nonsense and .. .bumps understanding has got running its head up against the limits of language."
!d. � 119, at 48.
Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with the methods of philosophy and the possibility of
philosophical discourse. He made no direct contributions to the analysis of legal discourse. The
crucial determination of a Wittgensteinian analysis of legal discourse may be whether we can think
of legal discourse as a ordinary language game situated within a form of life. If we can, adopting
Wittgenstein's functional approach to the meaning of legal propositions is indicated.
Wittgenstein had a great deal to say about meaning and almost nothing to say about law. He
rarely used legal examples. But see L. WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL 22 (G.E. M.Anscombe trans. 1970)
(posthumous compilation of fragmentary notes) (" 'This law was not given with such cases in view.'
Does that mean it is senseless?"). He wrote about rules, see, e. g., PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,
supra, �� 201, 240, but usually about "rules" of language games. My very tentative conclusion is
that Wittgenstein's analysis of rules does not lend unqualified support to the proponents of legal rule
indeterminacy in the current rule-indeterminacy debates. Cf Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 464, 477 (1987) (disputing the notion that language
and legal rules are significantly indeterminate).
33.

L.

WITfGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 32, at 103 (309).
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Viewed through Tushnet's eyes as essays impossibly premised on the
possibility of plain meaning interpretation, The Federalist is a work of
considerable irony. Addressed to the citizens of New York, The Federal
ist papers were intended to help persuade the public that opposition to
the proposed federal Constitution was misguided. The irony is that
efforts at persuading the public often involved explaining that the puta
tive plain meaning of constitutional provisions had been "wrongly" inter
preted in the popular press by intelligent opponents. This irony is
perhaps nowhere more manifest than in The Federalist 83.
In The Federalist 83, Hamilton faced the difficult task of explaining
the plain meaning of constitutional text while also explaining why that
plain meaning had escaped his adversaries. Hamilton's specific aim was
to counter the assertion that, since juries for criminal causes were
expressly guaranteed, the silence of the proposed Constitution as to jury
trials in civil cases entailed the constitutional abolition of civil jury trials.
Hamilton sought to counter any misconception that the Constitution
diminished such a cherished individual right. Casting the issue as one of
the proper interpretation of the meaning of a text, Hamilton undertook
to consider whether a text granting a right in one context could be inter
preted as denying the right in another.
It seems that if the Constitution's words had plain meaning, the dis
pute about whether the Constitution abolished civil jury trials would not
have arisen. Hamilton's account of why it arose attests to the strength of
his reliance, at least in The Federalist 83, on the plain meaning theory.
The dispute did not exist, according to Hamilton, because the meaning of
the text was unavailable to common sense for the text was perfectly clear
when read in accordance with the rigors of common sense, logic, and
traditional maxims of legal construction, correctly applied. 34 Hamilton's
ultimate explanation for the dispute was his opponents' intellectual bad
faith. 35 He strongly implied that their rights-based opposition dishon
estly masked a partisan anti-federalist political agenda.
Significantly, Hamilton did not ask the plain meaning argument to
stand alone in The Federalist 83. He also sought to convince his readers
that the lack of express provision for civil jury trial was of no practical
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 495-96 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossieter ed. 1961) ("To argue with
respect to the latter would, however, be as vain and fruitless as to attempt the serious proof of the
existence of malter, or to demonstrate any of those propositions which, by their own internal evi
dence, force conviction when expressed in language adapted to convey their meaning.").
35. Opponents resort to "contemptible" subtleties, they pervert "true meaning," they deny
what is plain to "[E]very man of discernment." !d. at 496.
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importance because the right to a civil jury was well-grounded in com
mon law. Civil jury rights were recognized, he assured his readers, even
in states like Connecticut where the written law made no express provi
sion for them. 36
Interestingly, the Chadha case seems to rest on the same logic that
Hamilton ridiculed in The Federalist 83. In Chadha, the Chief Justice
argued as follows: since the framers had expressly provided certain
exceptions to bicameralism and presidential presentment, it must be
inferred that other exceptions to bicameralism and presentment, such as
the one-house veto, were prohibited.37 In The Federalist 83 Hamilton
ridiculed anti-federalists who relied on the maxim that "[t]he expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another."38 Yet this would appear to be
the maxim of construction on which Chadha relied: the expression of
exceptions to bicameralism and presidential presentment excludes fur
ther exceptions.
The matter is more complicated. Hamilton did not ridicule all uses
of the above maxim. He seemed to imply that the maxim itself had "true
meaning," but was subject to "perverted" applications. An application is
perverse when it is contrary to common sense and reason. The difficulty
Hamilton's assessment poses is the uncertainty it raises about how to
determine when a use of a maxim of construction is perverse and when it
is true.
Hamilton himself thought it was as clear as "the existence of mat
ter" that his opponent's application was perverted.39 However, in a
post-Cartesian world, even matter is up for grabs. More to the point, the
legal conclusions we care most about rarely "by their own internal evi
dence force conviction."40 This makes Hamilton's plain meaning remedy
useless unless it is somehow possible to specify the methods of common
sense, reason, and construction that courts should rely on to reveal
whether a maxim of construction applies in a given instance, and with
what result.
If Hamilton would not balk at the maxim of construction Chadha
relied on, he might nonetheless be unsettled by a Supreme Court that
purports to safeguard majoritarian legislation by declining to be wise:
36.
37.
38.
39.
maxims
40.

-

Jd. at 503.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 496 (quoting legal maxims) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
!d. at 496 ("But as the inventors of this fallacy have attempted to support it by certain legal
of interpretation which they have perverted from their true meaning . .. . ).
Jd.
"

1714

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1701

"We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is
valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action
does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained."41 This is the
"judgment" to which Justices of the Supreme Court have sometimes
aspired. It is a process of blind application of Constitution to statute, a
process which purportedly depends upon ascertaining the unambiguous
meanings of each.
Outside of the confines of theories of interpretation and adjudica
tion, "judgment" today connotes a process that engages all of a person's
cognitive and moral resources. Judgment is a weighing of wants and
needs, deserts and merits, morality and utility. This weighing, of course,
is precisely what judicial judgment is not according to Chadha.42 The
narrower scope of judicial judgment advocated in Chadha is impossible,
if Tushnet's critique of plain meaning is correct, for it presupposes that
legal texts have meanings apart from those a court might like most to
attach to them and that a good judge is able to discern those meanings. 43
In The Federalist 78 Hamilton wrote that under the new Constitu
tion federal judges would be expected to exercise "judgment" rather than
"will." Any will they exercised as a co-equal branch would presumably
be the will to judge in accordance with the law. Hamilton believed that
the judiciary was the most "feeble" and least dangerous branch. The
legislature "commands the purse" and "prescribes the rules" and the
judiciary "must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments. "44 But it is doubtful that Hamil
ton, who believed the judiciary was essential to safeguard liberty, would
4 1. Hamilton stated, "The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by
the courts in the construction of the laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its
conformity to the source from which they are derived. This being the case, let me ask if it is consis
tent with reason or common sense to suppose, that a provision obliging the legislative power to
commit the trial of criminal causes to juries is a privation of its right to authorize or permit that
mode of trial in other cases?" !d. at 496.
If this fails as a reductio ad absurdum of the anti-federalist criticism of the Constitution, it is
because whether things not promised in a writing are excluded depends upon customary understand
ings and practices rather than the rules of deductive logic.

42.

462 U.S. at 944.

43. 462 U.S. at 944 ("the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution").
44. Hence the Court could cite with approval: "Once the meaning of an enactment is dis
cerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a
committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95
( 1978), cited in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 19, 944 (1982).
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have accepted the formulation of Chadha whereby concern for the wis
dom of a decision is contrasted with concern for its bare constitutional
ity. For the guiding assumption of The Federalist was that the
Constitution-"the intention of the people"-is to be "regarded by the
judges as, a fundamental law" for the advancement of the public good
and individual rights.45
To the extent of their skepticism about objectively valid conceptions
of "natural rights" and "the public good," contemporary plain meaning
theorists are hard pressed to reconcile what they ask judges to do with
fuller, contemporary conceptions of judgment. Plain meaning theory
was perhaps better suited to a less skeptical, less relativist era.
The Federalist 83 is an especially good indicator that the plain
meaning theory that can be attributed to The Federalist is not a simple
minded one. Consider a simple-minded plain meaning theory holding
that each canonical text in a language has a set of distinct meanings and
that these meanings will always be plain to any speaker of the language.
This simple-minded theory essentially denies ambiguity, ignorance, and
other barriers to written communication. It is a "straw man" theory too
implausible to be taken seriously. As Tushnet understands, textualist
theories can be very sophisticated.46 The ironic "meaning-explaining"
character of The Federalist project, Hamilton's treatment of a meaning
dispute in The Federalist 83, and the recalcitrant "dead letter" language
of The Federalist 22, are all indications of the complexity and sophistica
tion of any plain meaning theory that is fairly attributed to The Federal
ist. For Publius, the meaning of written law is plain, but only when texts
are well-drafted in modes of discourse open to discernment, reason and
common sense, and when those who purport to apply the texts rely on
true and proper maxims of construction.
45.

46.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 690.

